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The Right of Appeal in Talmudic Law
Arthur Jay Silverstein
The law is what it is today because of what the law was
yesterday; it cannot escape its ancestry,
Alison Reppy, Common Law Pleading, 2 N.Y. LAW
FORUM 1, 5 (1956).
ZHE SYSTEM of appellate review' in the United States has been
' criticized for its form and limited scope. 2  These concerns are
reflected in the various appellate procedures developed by Talmudic
law. Since jurisprudential systems typically establish methods of
review, the Talmudic choices
are important as they reveal
THE AUTHOR: ARTHUR JAY SILVER- some basic precepts of that sys-
STEIN (B.A., Rutgers University; J.D.,
Yale Law School) is currently pursuing tern and by comparison allow
post-doctoral studies in Jewish law at insights into our own. A com-
Mirrer Yeshivah in New York City.
His other publications in this field in- prehensive analysis of the ap-
clude: Adoption in Jewish Law, 47 peal procedure in Talmudic law
Conn. B.J. 73, and Consumer Protection is lacking.3 To what extent ap-
in Talmudic Law, 79 Comm. L.J. 279. lacki w exten ap-pellate review existed in Tal-
mudic law, and how justice was
administered and the litigant protected under this system, will be
the subject of the following inquiry.4 The Talmudic judicial struc-
1 Appellate review or appeal has been defined as one tribunal reviewing the pro-
ceedings of another or, more narrowly, as the carrying of a cause from a lower to a
higher tribunal for a rehearing. It is frequently regarded as a continuation of an
original suit rather than as the inception of a new action. We, however, will treat "ap-
peal" more broadly as encompassing procedures whereby a case will be reheard or re-
viewed by the same or another tribunal.
2 Some writers question the broad scope of review. Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion
of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 Sy. L. REV. 635 (1971). On the other hand,
others criticize the inability to appeal fact finding. Hood, The Right of Appeal, 29
LA. L. REV. 498 (1969). Also criticized is the inability to appeal sentencing. Kauf-
man, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249 (1962).
3 Various scholars have discussed procedure in Talmudic law. See, e.g., H. Goldin,
HEBREW CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1952); Hirshberg, Jurisprudence among
the Ancient Jews, 11 MARQ. L. REV. 25 (1926); S. MENDELSOHN, THE CRIMINAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ANCIENT HEBREWS (1890). Specific discussions of appeals
have been cursory, erroneous and often conflicting. Thus, May, in Jewish Criminal Law
and Legal Procedure, 31 J. AM. INS. CRIM. L. & C. 438 (1941), writes: "No appeal
against a sentence was provided for in Jewish law," while P. BENNY, THE CRIMINAL
CODE OF THE JEWS 48 (1880), claims that in Jewish law a "[r)ight of appeal existed."
4 This attempt will not be an easy one, as "the question of appellate jurisdiction in
Talmudic law is somewhat confusing and conflicting opinions may be reconciled only
with difficulty." D. SHOHET, THE JEW.ISH COURT IN THE MIDDLE AGES 207 (1931).
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ture and its role in Jewish society will be examined, followed by an
exploration of the various appellate procedures. Finally, the ef-
fectiveness of these procedures in fulfilling the traditional functions
of an appeal will be evaluated.
The Talmud, compiled and written during the first five cen-
turies of the common era, was the legal, ethical, and religious corpus
of the Jews. These people functioned under a highly developed
legal system which evolved and was minutely delineated in the Tal-
mud. The appellate procedures utilized in this system will be re-
constructed through the use of sources dating from the Mishnah
(circa 200 C.E.) to the Gemara (circa 500 C.E.) and will depict a
system which existed during the Second Temple period - 517
B.C.E.-70 C.E.5
I. THE BASIC SYSTEM
The Talmudic legal system differed fundamentally from modern
western systems. To evaluate that system's use of the appeal pro-
cess it is necessary to first delineate the structure of the system. In
viewing this structure and the functions of its various parts, the reli-
gious character of the society will become apparent. The Bible com-
manded the appointment of judges and executive officials in every
city and district," and partly in compliance with the Biblical imper-
ative, three types of courts appeared.7 The Beth Din was a three-
judge court utilized by settlements of less than one hundred and
twenty persons. The Sanhedrin, a twenty-three-judge court, sat in
larger cities. In Jerusalem there were two such Sanhedrins, one at
the foot of the Temple Hill and another at the entrance of the
court of the Temple.8 The Great Sanhedrin, a seventy-one judge
court, was also located in Jerusalem.9
aThe bulk of the materials consist of discussions of legal theory rather than actual
cases. See generally Z. FALK, INTRODUCTION TO JEWISH LAW OF THE SECOND COM-
MONWEALTH (1972).
6 "Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates." DEUTERONOMY XVI,
18; Maimonides, HILCHOTH SANHEDRIN I, 1. Maimonides (1135-1204) codified all
the Talmudic literature.
7 In civil cases, experts in the law - mumheb - could on occasion adjudicate cases
a!cne. SANHEDRIN 5a. However, the fages frowned upon such a procedure since "there
was no true single judge other than God alone." AVOT IV, 8. In any event, a litigant
could not be compelled to submit to the jurisdiction of a single judge. Shulchan Aruch,
HOSHEN MISHPAT, III, 2 (16th century code).
8 There may have been an additional court in Jerusalem because that city was more
populated than other cities in Palestine and alfo because there were certain unique
functions which the extra court performed.
9 Tosefta, SOTAH IX, 1.
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The various multi-judge courts had differing subject matter ju-
risdiction. The Beth Din had jurisdiction only over civil cases
which included robberies, personal injuries, rape, and seduction.' 0
In addition, certain ritual functions required the presence of the
Beth Din." The Sanhedrins had original jurisdiction in capital
cases'12 and could consider almost all civil, criminal, and religious
cases. The Great Sanhedrin was the highest court in the land with
exclusive jurisdiction in declaring a tribe idolatrous, determining a
false prophet, judging a high priest,' 3 testing a woman suspected
of adultery, 14 and sentencing a recalcitrant judge.' 5  This court was
further charged with tending to certain ritual functions, such as:
supervising the Temple service,'" burning the red heifer,"7 evaluat-
ing the harvest tithes,' and providing copies of the Torah scrolls for
the king.'9 The Great Sanhedrin possessed legislative and execu-
tive powers as well. These included: declaring an offensive war,2°
changing the boundaries of Jerusalem and the Temple courts,2' and
deeming a city to be apostate. 2
All the Talmudic courts had the power to legislate. Their en-
10 In Talmudic law, cases such as robbery and rape were designated as civil because
the transgression entailed a civil remedy of paying a monetary fine to the injured parties.
11 SANHEDRIN, I, 1. E.g., redemption of unvalued tithes, the rites of halizah (a
ceremony releasing the brother-in-law of a childless widow from his duty to marry her)
(DEUTERONOMY XXV, 5-10), and certain calendar decisions upon which ritual was
based.
12 SANHEDRIN I, 4. Certain capital cases were tried only by the Great Sanhedrin.
See notes 13-15 infra and accompanying text.
13 SANHEDRIN I, 5.
14 SOTAH I, 4.
15 SANHEDRIN XI, 2-4. A member of a superior court was recalcitrant if he refused
to abide by the ruling of the Great Sanhedrin. Such a judge was in jeopardy of indict-
ment and capital punishment. SIFRE II, 52; SANHEDRIN 86b. The Talmudic sages did
not adopt the strict Biblical injunction of DEUTERONOMY XVII, 12. Thus a judge
who continued to expound law contrary to a Sanhedrin was not executed. If a judge,
however, ruled contrary to the decisions of the Great Sanhedrin he would be undermin-
ing the very foundations of the judiciary and would be subject to capital punishment.
16 YOMA I, 3.
17 SANHEDRIN III, 4. The Biblical imperative was that a red heifer "wherein is no
blemish, and upon which never came a yoke," should be burned and her ashes used to
cleanse those ritually unclean. NUMBERS XIX.
18 PEAH II, 6.
19 Tosefta, SANHEDRIN IV, 4.
20 SANHEDRIN 1, 5. Every war was considered offensive (i.e., not obligatory) by the
rabbis except wars of self defense and those commanded in the Bible, i.e., the war
against the Amalekite tribes, DEUTERONOMY XXV, 17-19, and those wars led by
Joshua against the Canaanite tribes, DEUTERONOMY XX, 16-18.
21 SANHEDRIN I, 5.
22 DEUTERONOMY XIII, 13-18. The Sanhedrin had additional non-judicial func-
tions, e.g., arranging the calendar. ROSH HASHONAH II, 5.
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actments were, however, subject to repeal by another court which
was both greater in number and comprised of superior scholars.23
However, a court could stipulate in enacting a law that any other
court seeing fit to abrogate the law could do so. 4
The several Talmudic courts had different methods for selection
of judges and formation. The Beth Din was not a permanent
court, but was formed when necessary from a pool of judges who
normally had other occupations. These judges were certified by
the Great Sanhedrin which applied certain minimum qualifica-
tions.2 ' To assemble a court of three, plantiff and defendant each
chose one eligible judge, and these two judges chose the third.2
The Sanhedrin and the Great Sanhedrin were permanent courts
whose membership was appointed as follows:
It is stated by the Rabbis that the Great Sanhedrin used to send
messengers throughout the Land of Israel to examine (candidates)
for the office of judge. Whoever was found to be wise, sinfear-
ing, humble and contrite, of unblemished character, and enjoying
the esteem of his fellow men were installed as local judge. From
the local court, he was promoted to the court situated at the en-
trance of the Temple Mount; thence to the court situated at the
entrance of the Court; thence to the Supreme Court. 27
To be certified for the position of judge in a Sanhedrin, the
candidates had to satisfy criteria which measured their character as
well as their knowledge. A candidate who gambled, lent or bor-
rowed money on interest, or did not engage in a decent profession
was disqualified.2 8  A potential judge was disqualified if he were
23 EDIOTH I, 5. See also BAVA KAMMA 82b; BEROCHOTH 22b.
24 The logic being that if a law were promulgated to meet the demands of a specific
situation and the conditions no longer warrant such a law, then it should be revoked
by a later day court.
25Mosaic law required that the three judges be authorized and competent, but
Rabbinic law allowed all three to be laymen in cases concerning loans where it would
be difficult to assemble a court. Maimonides, HILCHOTH SANHETRIN V, 8.
The rationale of the rabbis was that if the lender were put to the trouble of assem-
bling a court of authorized judges to collect his loan, "it would shut the door to borrow-
ers," hence credit would be more difficult to obtain. SANHEDRIN 2b, 3a.
Mosaic or Biblical law consists of the precepts explicitly stated in the Torah and
those which the Talmudic savants interpreted to be Biblical in origin. Rabbinic law
consists of the enactments of the Talmudic savants.
26 Various rules were in effect concerning ineligibility of a judge in a given case be.
cause of prejudicial interest, e.g., judges who were relatives, friends, or enemies of any of
the litigants. SANHEDRIN 28b and 29a.
27 Maimonides, HILCHOTH SANHEDRIN II, 8, trans. by A. Hershman, THE BOOK OF
JUDGES (1949); TOSEFTA SANHEDRIN VIII, 1. The Great Sanhedrin was apparently
organized by Moses. NUMBERS XI, 16.
28 SANHEDRIN I1l, 3.
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aged, a eunuch, childless, 9 or marred by any physical blemish,3"
since the concept of a theocracy made the appointment of judges
not only a civil ceremony but also a religious one.31 A judge needed
to know "the answer to any problem and phase of Jewish law and
custom.' '32 Wisdom, understanding, and fame were also required.
3 3
Candidates had to be able, God fearing men who hated unjust
gain.3 4  The candidate who met all the qualifications was eligible
to receive 'Semikhah' (ordination) - a certification which entitled
him to act in the capacity of a judge in a Sanhedrin.
The requirements for membership to the Great Sanhedrin of
seventy one were even more exacting. One had to have been a
man of stature, wisdom, good appearance, mature age, versed in
sorcery, 5 conversant with all the seventy languages, 36 and skilled in
dialectics. 7
The Talmudic courts, consisting of highly qualified judges, were
part of a jurisprudential system; they did not function indepen-
dently. Under certain circumstances, cases would come before more
than one court. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the instances
where this "review" occurred.
II. THE APPELLATE PROCESS
Talmudic law allowed six procedures which permitted one court
to consider matters originally brought to another court or otherwise
permitted redetermination of previously settled matters. Each of
these procedures will be discussed with a view to the purpose it
fulfilled and the modern procedures which might have similar func-
tions.
First, if the original court felt it were incapable or unqualified
to consider a question of law it could send the case to a higher
20 "Because a member of the Sanhedrin must have compassion." Maimonides, HIL-
CHOTHI SANHEDRIN 11, 3.
3 0 TOSEFTA SANHEDRIN VIII; SANHEDRIN 36b.
31 J. Newman, SEMIKHAH vii (1950).
3 2 YERUSHALMI HAGIGAH 1, 8.
33 The Jewish sages adduced these qualities from DEUTERONOMY I, 13. Midrash
Rabbah, DEUTERONOMY I.
34 These qualities were adduced from EXODUS XVIII, 2 1.
35 Maimonides explains that this knowledge was important so that the court in sen-
tencing sorcerers would be able to differentiate between what was and was not sorcery.
36 The reason for this requirement was so that the court would not have to hear
evidence through aninterpreter.
37 The dialectical proficiency required was that one prove that a reptile was clean
even though the Bible considered it ritually unclean.
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court and eventually to the Great Sanhedrin for determination. 8
This procedure represented an acknowledgement of the court's lim-
itations 9 which was Biblically mandated. 0 As a result, a court was
never compelled to give a decision in a case it did not feel secure
and competent adjudicating. However, this option to send the
case to a higher court was available to the court rather than the liti-
gants4' and the utilization of the procedure did not terminate or
suspend the original court's responsibility in the case. The court
appointed a muflah42 - official pleader of the court - to accom-
pany the litigants to each successive court and present the ques-
tion. 8 As in common law jurisdiction the lower court would make
88 The appeal proceeded from the original court to the Sanhedrin of a local town,
to the Sanhedrin sitting at the foot of the Temple mound, to the Sanhedrin sitting at
the entrance of the court of the Temple, and finally to the Great Sanhedrin. The ap-
pellate process proceeded through these stages until the question was brought to a court
which was able to answer the question. The Great Sanhedrin, as the court of last re-
sort, was required to resolve all issues brought before it. TOSEFTA SANHEDRIN VII, 1;
SIFRE II, 152; SANHEDRIN 88b; YERUSHALMI SANHEDRIN IV, 1.
89 Philo described the need for such a procedure:
Let no judge be ashamed to confess that he is ignorant of that which he is
ignorant .... When, therefore, the case looks to him obscure by reason of the
perplexed and unintelligible nature of the circumstances which throw uncer-
tainty and darkness around it, he ought to decline giving a decision and
send the matter before judges who will understand it more accurately.
Quoted in S. BELKIN, PHILO AND THE ORAL LAW 190 (1940).
40 The Biblical ordinance required that:
If there arise a matter too hard for thee in judgment, between blood and
blood, between plea and plea, and between stroke and stroke, even matters
of controversy within thy gates; then shalt thou arise, and get thee up unto
the place which the Lord thy God shall choose. And thou shalt come unto
the priests the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days; and.
thou shalt inquire; and they shall declare unto thee the sentence of judg-
ment.
DEUTERONOMY XVII, 8-9; SANHEDRIN XI, 2; ToSEFTA HAGIGAH II, 9. The Great San-
hedrin was viewed as "the place ... God shall choose."
41 Under Federal procedure an unresolved case may come before an appellate court
for a determination of difficult and controlling legal questions. However, the district
court judge must make some order regarding the issue which also states that the order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for dif-
ference of opinion. Then the parties may appeal the order and the court of appeals may
in its discretion permit the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
42 See H. MANTEL, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE SANHEDRIN 135-39 (1961).
43 This practice of the lower court communicating personally with the upper court
differs from modern United States practice where:
[the trial judge is walled off from the upper-court judges. They may not
consult him.. They learn about the trial only from a formal printed record.
This practice complicates and artificializes appeals. I think that, at any rate
whenever the upper-court judges deem it desirable, the trial judge should sit
with them on the hearing of an appeal, but that he should have no vote. He
could then point to facts in the record to which neither litigant had directed
the upper court's attention. This is not a new idea. It means a return to a
[Vol. 6: 33
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all factual determinations before the case entered the appellate sys-
tem and the appellate court would consider only questions of law.
While the appellate court would not disturb factual findings made
below, the lower court was bound to follow the law as determined
by the higher court.
A second procedure for obtaining a higher court's consideration
of a case was also initiated by the lower court judges. In cases
where a judge had not agreed with the majority of the court44 he
had the option of appealing the decision to a higher court.45 Since
the right was not given to the party aggrieved by the court's deci-
sion, the procedure differs from the modern right of appeal.
Third, if the plaintiff felt he could not receive a fair trial from
the local Sanhedrin, he could initiate the litigation in another San-
hedrin.46 The defendant could not demand as of right a change of
venue to another Sanhedrin, however, he could insist that the case
be removed from the local court to the Great Sanhedrin.47 When a
defendant's request for removal from one local court to another
was denied by the plaintiff,4" the defendant could demand that the
court submit its reasons in writing (they usually handed down an
oral verdict) 49 so that he would be aware of the legal reasoning the
practice which once prevailed in some English and in some American courts
[and the Talmudic courts as well.]
J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, 252-53 (4th ed. 1969).
44 Decisions were reached by majorities. SANHEDRIN 2a.
45 See note 38 supra.
46 SANHEDRIN 31 b. The defendant was considered subordinate to the plaintiff be-
cause of a verse in PROVERBS XXII, 7, "The borrower is a servant to the lender."
47 BAVA KAMMA 112b. See Tosafoth (12th century commentary) ad. loc.; Rashba
(thirteenth century commen:ary) ad loc.; YAM SHEL SHLOMO, (sixteenth century com-
mentary) X, 10. But see Maimonides, HILCHOTH SANHEDRIN, VI, 6. See generally
L. FINKELSTEIN, JEWISH SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES 379-381 (1972).
48 In the United States the defendant may request dismissal of a case or removal of
a case to another court for a variety of reasons: (1) The court chosen by the plain-
tiff is not convenient for trying the case. However, such removal is not a matter of
right but rather is in the discretion of the original court. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2)
The case was brought in a state court and a Federal district court has "original jurisdic-
tion." 28 U.S.C. § 1441. This "original jurisdiction" can be based on the amount
in controversy and the diversity of citizenship between the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Permitting removal for diversity may reflect a concern that the defendant could not
receive a fair trial at the hands of a court of the plaintiff's state. Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S.
595 (1855); Asher v. Pacific Power & Light Co. 249 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
(3) There is improper venue since the court is not in the district "in which the claim
arose," or is not in the district in which the defendant resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
49 Scribes recorded the verdicts and opinions in capital cases. Maimonides, HIL-
CHOTH SANHEDRIN XI, 3.
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court employed.50, Since this option of removal was invoked be-
fore the actual commencement of the trial it was not a true appel-
late procedure.5
Fourth, cases could be reopened after judgment on presenta-
tion of new evidence. In criminal cases only the defendant could
exercise this privilege. While the privilege could be utilized twice
as a matter of right,52 thereafter the defendant had to convince two
judges from the court which convicted him that there was new
evidence which might effect the case before it would be reopened. 53
In civil cases either party could obtain a new hearing by submitting
new evidence to the same court.14  However, to prevent abusive
tactics there was a thirty day limit on the exercise of the privilege. 5
A court also could review its decision if it had any misgivings,56
except in criminal cases where only convictions could be reconsid-
ered.5 7
Fifth, in cases in which it was permissible to have a single jus-
tice,58 the decisions were subject to appellate review by a court
"superior in both learning and number."59  Appellate review was
limited to questions of law rather than fact.60 If the decision was
5 0 The discretion to approve a defendant's request for change of venue to another
sanhedrin rested entirely with the plaintiff. In American civil procedure the judge
exercises his discretion.
51 SANHEDRIN 3 lb; Maimonides, Hilchoth Sanhedrin, VI, 6.
52 SANHEDRIN IV, 1. OVADIAH BERTINORO (commentary of the fifteenth century)
explains that the first times the convicted exercised this right the validity of his conten-
tions was not challenged, for under such emotional strain and fright he might be un-
able to express himself properly. A herald would go forth before the convicted crying,
"So and so is going to be killed, in that he has committed such and such an offense. So
and so are his witnesses. Anyone knowing any information in his defense, let him
come and urge it." SANHEDRIN VI, 1.
53 Maimonides elaborates that the defendant was brought back to the court where the
judges considered his arguments. Maimonides, Hilchoth Sanhedrin XIII, 1. Rashi, how-
ever explains that the procession stopped while the judges contemplated the arguments
of defendant who remained outside. Loc. cit. SANHEDRIN 42b.
54 SANHEDRIN III, 8.
55 NEDARIM 27a, R. Nissim; which might be analogized to a statute of limitations.
Its purpose was not to bar the bringing of an action but to make actions final. In the
United States the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel would bar the reopen-
ing of the case.
56 Cf. Maimonides, Hilchotb Sanhedrin XXIV.
57 SANHEDRIN 33b. This and the exclusive privilege of the defendant to submit
new evidence in criminal trials in effect accomplish the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against retrials after acquittals becaue of double jeopardy. Cf. Silverstein, Double Jeop-
ardy and Hung Juries.: United States v. Castellanos, 5 RUTG. CAM. L.J. 218 (1974).





held erroneous the case was retried in accordance with the appel-
late ruling."'
Sixth, if one convicted in a foreign court escaped to Palestine,
his former judgment would be vacated.62  This was a special right
unique to Palestine courts, "the merit of Palestine.' '6 However,
modern courts often give foreign judgments - whether criminal
or civil - limited effect."4
• Although there were six different ways for a qualified, limited
type of appellate review in Talmudic law, there is little evidence in
the contemporary literature of frequent invocation of these proce-
dures.65
III. THE FUNCTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
TALMUDIC APPELLATE PROCEDURES
Although there was only a limited appellate process in Talmudic
law, the basic purposes of appellate view in a legal system were
achieved. The Talmudic procedures enabled the system to prevent
occasional miscarriages of justice, provided sufficient uniformity in
the application of the law, allowed the losing litigant an additional
chance in some cases, 6 and facilitated further development of Jew-
ish law as a jurisprudential system.
One basic function of the appeal is that:
It provides the judicial process with the means of preventing oc-
casional miscarriages of justice which would otherwise from time
to time occur. Every person convicted of a crime is wisely given
access to our appellate courts so as to assure, in so far as the issue of
guilt or innocence is involved, that justice has been done, that a
fair trial has, in fact, been held, and that the evidence is sufficient
to justify, beyond any reasonable doubt, the findings against him.67
61 SANHEDRIN 32a.
6 2 M AKKOTH 7a.
63 Rashi (11th century commentary) and Ritvah (14th century commentary) explain
that perhaps the court will find some grounds to acquit the fugitive.
64 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657
(1892).
65 There are only two instances in the Mishnah of final decisions being handed down
by the Great Sanhedrin: EDIOTH, VII, 4; PEAH II, 6. Only a limited number of actual
cases are recorded in the Talmud. See S. HOENIG, THE GREAT SANHEDRIN, 264 n. 27
(1953) for a partial listing.
166 See e.g., notes 58-61 supra, and accompanying text and notes 62-63 and accom-
panying text.
67 Sobeloff, Appellate Review of Criminal Sentences, in R. SCIGLIANo, THE COURTS
264 (1962).
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One view of due process thus dictates that safeguards exist to avoid
error6 8 and review by another court is one such safeguard.
Although under Talmudic law the courts employed judges who,
like all judges, were fallible,69 the chances of error occurring were
not as great as in other legal systems for divers reasons.
Since Talmudic courts consisted of so many judges, review oc-
curred while the trial court was contemplating a decision. 70  Each
judge gave his verdict and his reasons, and thus in criminal cases
each judge had an opportunity to hear the arguments of more than
twenty of his colleagues. 71  Error of opinion could be tolerated be-
cause so many judges were free to offset it. The number of justices
also greatly reduced the chances of bribery, bias, or prejudice.72
More judges reviewed the case that had merely gone to trial under
this system than review a case that has gone to the United States
Supreme Court.73
The rigid selection standards for judges was one factor helping
to assure accurate rulings. Another one was that the judges were
particularly familiar with the law since even laymen were well
versed in the law which governed every aspect of their conduct.74
"Jewish jurisprudence . .. does not depend on judges. The func-
68 Other conceptions of due process do not view the possibility of an appeal as indis-
pensable:
It has frequently been held that due process of law is not violated merely be-
cause the decision in the lower court was erroneous. One hearing is all that is
necessary, provided that one be fair and impartial. It therefore follows that
due process does not guarantee a right of appeal to a higher court.
R. MOT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 236-37 (1926). Mott cites over 70 cases to buttress
this conclusion. But see E. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION 253 (1955); "Moreover,
even after an accused has been found guilty, due process of law requires that we pro-
vide some sort of remedial procedure to uncover and correct any serious error that may
have been committed in the trial of his case."
69 Even the United States Supreme Court has often times overturned its own rulings,
showing its own susceptibility to error or else demonstrating that conditions change.
70 See notes 6-9 supra, and accompanying text.
71 Leaving aside the practical issues of having so many judges, it could be argued
that this method of adjudicating was far more advantageous and desirable than the com-
mon law system employed in the United States for it provided that a greater number of
judges would hear any given case.
72 Such a preponderance of judges enhances the chances of justice by negating many
of the human shortcomings that one judge is not only susceptible to, but an inevitable
victim of. See generally J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 147-56 (4th ed. 1969) for a
presentation of the many pitfalls in giving a proper judicial decision including: idiosyn-
cracies, unconscious prejudiced identifications and personal bias.
73 In Talmudic law all cases had the benefit of many judges viewing it on the trial
level, while in America only those cases appealed even approach such a procedure.
74 See M. SILBERG, TALMUDIC LAW AND THE MODERN STATES 51-53, 92 (1973).
Cf. SANHEDRIN 94b which states that in the time of Hezkiah (700 B.C.E.) every man,
woman, and child knew the complex laws of purity and defilement.
(Vol. 6: 33
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tion of the law is not to prescribe for the judge how to decide; it
prescribes for the person how to conduct his life."7  Since the
judges considered the execution of their duties a religious obliga-
tion,76 they acted with the same zeal and care as they manifested in
the performance of other religious duties. To them, a mistake would
not have resulted in a miscarriage of justice but rather a religious
transgression. 77  The adjudication of cases was so religious a duty
that the judges could not receive any remuneration for their ser-
vices.78 When judges are religiously motivated in hearing a case
the chances of error are reduced.
Talmudic law provided further safeguards against error through
very strict laws regarding testimony,7" witnesses,80 and admissibil-
ity."1 The rules were particularly stringent in cases of criminal con-
cern. 2  Moreover, judgeships were a lifetime appointment,"5 thus
reducing external pressures on judges.8 4 When an error did occur,
a dissenting justice could always ask the Great Sanhedrin to review
the case.
It is apparent that Talmudic law took great care in securing the
judicial process from error, at least for the benefit of the criminal
defendant. The emphasis placed on acquitting a criminal defen-
75Id. at 48.
7 6 DEUTERONOMY XVII, 12; XIII, 15.
7 See HORAYOTH 2a ff. outlining the situations in which reliance by the people on
mistaken judicial rulings required the offering of sacrifices.
7 8 BEKOROTH 29a.
9 All cross examination was conducted by the judges, since there were no defense
counsel or prosecutors. Criminal suits were initiated by the accusation of two witnesses.
Perjury was a very serious offense sometimes punished by giving the false witness the
punishment which would have befallen the accused had the false testimony gone un-
discovered. DEUTERONOMY XIX, 16-19; MAKKOTH I.
80 If the witnesses in any way contradicted each other in testimony which they gave
the authorities while secluded from each other - even in insignificant details
their testimony was declared inadmissible. SANHEDRIN V, 2.
81 For example in American law the Fifth Amendment pro:ects a man from being
compelled to be a witness against himself in criminal cases, while in Talmudic law a
witness cannot even voluntarily testify against himself in such cases. TOSEFTA SHA-
VUOTH V, 4. See generally A. KIRSCHHNBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW
(1970).
82 E.g., the court would have warned a witness: If you saw the accused running
with his sword in his hand after the victim, and you then found the accused standing
over the dying body, if you did not actually see the act of murder, then your testimony
is valueless. SAN14EDRIN 37b. "It is better to risk saving a guilty person than to con-
demn an innocent one." E. Voltaire, ZADIG. chap. 6, reflects the Talmudic view.
83 The disadvantages were recognized early by Aristotle, "That judges of important
causes should hold office for life is not a good thing, for the mind grows old as well as
the body." POLITICS, Book II, trans. by D. Jowett.
84 SANHEDRIN 86.
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dant resulted in there being few convictions. 85 Once one was judged
innocent, even if new evidence were presented or the judges ad-
mitted an error had been committed, the decision could not be re-
versed. This was based on the Biblical verse: "The innocent and
the righteous slay not,"86 which the Talmudic sages interpreted as
meaning that the innocent and righteous though later found in fact
guilty should not be punished.8" However, some maintain that
since it was so hard to get a conviction, the King of Israel had the
discretionary power to execute.88 Since most verdicts were not guil-
ty and the courts and people wanted such decisions,8" there was lit-
tle demand or need for appellate review to guarantee protection
from error.
The Talmudic law's leniency toward the criminal defendant is
at odds with the common law perception of criminal law as a de-
terrent to crime. One explanation for the Talmudic approach is
that:
[sluch was the concern of Jewish law for the life of a human be-
ing and the treatment afforded him out of respect for the dignity
of the individual. This was the logical result of the basic con-
cept that man was created in God's image.90
It must be borne in mind, moreover, that Talmudic law was a legal
system guided and determined by religious principles that were con-
sidered sacred law. Consequently the court had perfect faith that
the transgressor would be punished by divine means if he escaped
his deserved retribution in the courtroom.91 Thus, given the con-
85 A court which executed one man in seven years and according to others one in
seventy years was considered tyrannical. MAKKOTH I, 10. Rabbis Tarfon and Akiba
claim that had they been in the Sanhedrin, then no one would ever have been put to
death, Id. They would have scrutinized the tettimony of the witnesses until a reason for
inadmissibility would have been discovered. Rabbi Simeon B. Gamaliel, however,
responded to Rabbis Tarfon and Akiba by saying, "They would have multiplied mur-
derers in Israel." Id.
86 EXODUS XIII, 7.
87 SANHEDRIN 33b; MEKHILTA KASPA. The prohibition on double jeopardy was
scrupulously upheld.
88 See Maimonides, Hilchotb Rotzeach II, 4.
89 Numerous passages in Josephus clearly reflect his satisfaction and that of his con-
temporaries with the Talmudic legal system. See e.g., Josephus, AGAINST APION II, Sec.
21; II, Sec. 32; II, Sec. 38.
90 Auerbach, The Talmud - A Gateway to the Common Law, 3 W. RES. L. REV.
5 (1951).
91 The Talmud often articulated the concept: "acquitted according to the laws of man,
but guilty according to divine law." BAVA KAMMA 29a, 55b, 56a; BAVA METZIAH 82b.
The divine methods for retribution were detailed by the Talmudic sages:
He who would have been sentenced to stoning, either falls down from the
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ceptual philosophy under which jurisprudence operated in Talmudic
law,92 the possibility of an occasional error would not give rise to a
need for complete appellate review.
Appeals also insure uniformity in the interpretation of laws by
courts within one jurisdiction. As demonstrated in America, with-
out uniformity there is a search by the litigants for the court whose
legal precedents and interpretations will be most sympathetic.93
Moreover, there is a general offensiveness in a procedure whereby
all are not given similar justice in the application of all laws govern-
ing all the people. 4
Although a true appeal process did not exist in Talmudic law,
the courts had other means to assure uniform application of the
law. If a judge felt his colleagues had erred in their decision the
case could be brought to the Great Sanhedrin for a final interpreta-
tion of the law and uniformity would be thereby achieved. 5 Since
each local court had exclusive jurisdiction within a territory and
since a court would generally be consistent with its own prior rul-
ings, uniformity would be found within any court's individual lo-
cale. " However, since all judges were given the power to inter-
pret the law, it would be inconceivable to demand that one court's
opinion be vacated or overturned merely because other courts had
decided differently. Since the Talmud never maintained there was
roof or a wild beast treads him down. He who would have been sentenced to
burning, either falls into a fire or a serpent bites him. He who would have
been sentenced to decapitation, is either delivered to the government or rob-
bers come upon him. He who would have been sentenced to strangulation,
is either drowned in the river or dies from suffocation.
KETUBOTH 30b.
92 The concept of acquittal of the guilty only applied to criminal cases. In civil cases
to take the money from A unjustly and give it to B, although A will surely be compen-
sated by divine means, would be culpable since it would cause unjustified pain and suf-
fering to the innocent A.
93 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74, 76-77 (1938). Perfect uniform-
ity, however, does not exist in the United States. See generally Hart, The Relations Be-
tween State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954).
94 Although some do not agree that a Supreme Court of the land is necessary to re-
solve contradictions, there is agreement that contradictions within the laws cannot be
tolerated. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF THE LAW 112 (2d ed. 1969).
9 5 SANHEDRIN 86b.
96 Historically the autonomy of the cities in Palestine in Talmudic times could be
likened to states in America. This structural analogy answers not only the lack of neces-
sity for uniformity, but also highlights a duty to uphold the differences between the
political divisions, as is done in our states.
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a specific correct answer to a question,97 a decision which followed
a minority rule was also considered correct. 8
The lack of uniformity was not considered to be offensive to
justice. As the Talmudic sages explained:
Had the Torah been given as an unflexible, rigid code of laws,
there would be no reason for courts to deliberate or pass judgments
• . . Moses prayed, 'Lord of the Universe, explain me what the
law is'; to which the retort: 'There is not a fixed law, only the prin-
ciple of - majority rules', and one on trial is judged according
to this decision. Therefore the law will change with the same
frequency as the opinion of the majority varies.99
The existence of the Great Sanhedrin was a safeguard which placed
reasonable limits (measured by tradition, basic principles, and in-
alienable rights) on the freedom of the local court to interpret the
law. Excessive forum shopping was discouraged by the transpor-
tation difficulties involved."' Since the Talmudic law did not
strive for uniformity and the practice of forum shopping was lim-
ited, a right of appeal was not needed to assure uniform applica-
tion of the law.
There also seems to be a consensus of opinion that a losing
party should at least have another chance to present his case before
another judge. Society has always been concerned that the people
have faith in the availability of judicial equity.1 °1 Giving the liti-
gant another opportunity in court helps minimize any allegations or
complaints that he may have."' This consideration was not sig-
nificant in Talmudic law because people were usually satisfied with
the original hearing.' The lack of an appellate review did not
deny the litigant the opportunity to have his case heard by many
while it avoided some inequities present in other systems.10 4  Since
97 "Even though Rabbinical opinions may be diametrically opposed, they are both
inspired by the Living God." ERUVIN 13b.
98 When declaring the law, the majority opinion was followed in the disputations
and the debates in the rabbinic academies in the Talmud. BAVA METZIAH 59b.
9 9 
YERUSHALMI SANHEDRIN IV, 2.
100 See S. BARON, A SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE JEWS II, 245, 249
(2d ed. 1952).
101 Cf. J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 119-20 (1969).
102 It has even been suggested that the entire court process is perhaps for the psy-
chological satisfaction of the litigants. See Smith, Components of Proof in Legal Pro-
ceedings 51 YALE L.J. 537 (1942).
103 See note 89 supra.
104 For example, in the Federal procedure in the United States for appellate review,
the District Court and the Court of Appeals might hand down unanimous decisions in
favor of the plaintiff, and the Supreme Court might reverse on a 5 to 4 decision; plain.
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on balance the participants in the Talmudic system did not feel they
were denied justice, the lack of a second hearing did not render
the system inadequate."0 5
In other court systems, the appeal is important as a medium for
developing and improving the law, frequently preparing the way
for reform by the courts or legislatures."°6 A judge's remarks can
often attract the attention of the legislature to areas warranting
correction."' 7 Such an opportunity for focusing on legislative needs
was unnecessary in Talmudic law since the courts themselves had the
sole power to legislate. 8
IV. CONCLUSION
The right of appeal, according to current standard, did not exist
in Talmudic law. But various quasi appellate procedures coupled
with other judicial safeguards guaranteed due process and equitable
verdicts without that right.
A right of appeal may not enhance the administration of justice.
In some cases a trial judge may not pursue his task with the neces-
sary sense of responsibility since he may not feel his decision is es-
sential when he realizes his judgment is not final, but is subject to
appeal by either party. 109 Clearly, the Talmudic approach to ap-
peals is not being advocated for other systems. However, it is both
interesting and important for the legal profession to consider the
ways in which other legal orders have dealt with problems endemic
to all systems.
tiff is certainly not happy knowing more courts and more judges ruled in his favor but
the defendant has received a favorable judgment.
105 Of course our legal procedures as they exist serve social purposes. But it is
when they lack validity or reality that the laws will tend to be held in con-
tempt. It should be apparent that our courts are not giving satisfaction today,
J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 119-20 (1969).
10 6 L. MAYERS, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE 66 (1963).
107 See, e.g., the remarks of Justice Stewart: "Since 1879 Connecticut has had on its
books a law ... I think this is an uncommonly silly law .... But we are not asked in
this case to say whether we think this law is unwise or even asinine." Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10 8 See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
109 Contra,
In truth the purpose of review is prevention quite as much as correction of
mistakes. The possibility of review by another tribunal, especially a bench
of judges, as distinguished from a single administrative official of first instance.
... It is also a stimulus to care and thoroughness so as not to make mistakes.
R. POUND, 5 JURISPRUDENCE 607 (1959).
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